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33rd Battalion in Action

Friday, March 30th, 2018

	As the German Operation Michael continued, the Allies fought to bring the advance to a halt. The role played by the men of 33rd Battalion, AIF is described by their commanding officer in the following report. Counter Attack Operation Afternoon and Evening 30th of March 1918 by 33rd Battalion AIF. Position of Readiness. 1. At 10.30am the 33rd Battalion moved from billets in Oachy to a position of readiness on the South Western edge of the Bois D’Aquenne. The enemy shelled Oachy from 10am but we suffered no casualties. Instructions 2. At 2.15pm I reported to you at the Brigade Report Centre at 62D.U.33.o.35.40 and received your orders to capture and establish a line from the Copse immediately South of the first O in Marcelcave to Aubercourt and to capture Aubercourt which was in possession of the enemy. The 33rd Battalion would work in conjunction with the 12th Lancers who were 400 strong, and would have the 34th Battalion in support. Dispositions 3. The following orders were issued by me verbally to Company commanders at 2.45pm. B Coy under Lt J G A Pockley will establish a line from the Copse just south of the first C in Marcelcave to a point 100 yards east of the cross roads in V.14.b A Coy under Captain J W Sereeve will capture Aubercourt and establish a line on the Eastern and Southern sides of this village. As Demuin is held by the enemy, particular attention is to be paid to the roads leading over the do Luce from Beuin and Courcelles. C Coy under Captain W J C Duncan MC. will be in reserve in the valley South East of the Bois de Hangard and to be ready to capture Demuin. Battalion Headquarters will be with the Rserve Coy B Teans, according to SS.138, will not be taken into action but will be sent to Blangy Tronville. Approach March 4. At 3.10pm the Battalion marched under the command of Major F G Grant from Bois D’Aquenne and moved across country in a column of route to the assembly position 200 yards to the West of the Villers-Bretonnox to Aubercourt Road in U.18.a. This position was reached at 4.325pm. At 5pm I sent forward two patrols from the Platoon of the 9th Corps Cyclists to reconnoitre North and South of the wood East of Bois de Hangard and then as far forward towards Aubercourt and Marcelcave as possible. I regret to report that the Platoon Commander Lt. Gratwicke was killed. The 12th Lancers preceded the 33rd Battalion and reached the wood East of Bois de Hangard at about 4.15pm. (This wood will in future be referred to as Lancer Wood) Together with my Adjutant, Scout Officer and Cavalry Liaison Officer I rode ahead with the cavalry and reconnoitred the position. Stragglers and Withdrawals 5. On our way to Lancer Wood we passed several bodies of troops peculiarly and unclosley entrenched in queer places and large parties of stragglers. On reaching the wood we found the whole front line garrison east of Lancer Wood withdrawing although there was no hostile fire of any kind and no signs of attack. I met two Brigadiers and a Battalion Commander in the wood and informed them that was happening and asked them — that they got their men back to the line at once. This they promised to do. The Cavalry Commander also helped in the matter by sending a Squadron dismounted to re-establish the line, The infantry went forward with the cavalry but in a reluctant manner. During the whole time we were forward men were constantly leaving the line. There seemed to be no effort to check this straggling. Action of the Cavalry. 6. It was a proud privilege to be allowed to work with such a fine Regiment as the 12th Lancers. The approach march instilled in the men the utmost confidence and enthusiasm and I am glad to say greatly reduced the effect of so much straggling. They lost no time in effectively clearing Lancer Wood and got there just in time as the enemy had obtained a footing on the Southern and South Eastern edges. The Lancers protected the edges and allowed us to move forward to the attack. On seeing the cavalry there, the enemy shelled Lancer Wood very heavily, chiefly with 5.0s paying particular attention to the outer fringes. Fairly heavy casualties to horses were inflicted there. The horses were soon led from the wood to a position west of the Villers-Bretinneux to Aubercourt Road. The discipline during the heavy shelling was an object lesson. During the attack the cavalry protected both our flanks, the left with two Hotchkiss guns. They withdrew at about 7pm. All ranks were eager to give every possible help to us, throughout there was whole hearted cooperation. The experience gained in this our first operation with cavalry was invaluable. One was able too to judge of the splendid work they were doing for the Army at this present time and they cannot be too highly praised. Infantry Action The 33rd Battalion moved forward from the position of assembly at 3pm. The formation adapted by Companies was as follows: One Platoon in extended order, followed by two Platoons in line in artillery formation, the fourth Platoon in reserve also in artillery formation. B Company moved along the northern edge of Lancer Wood and widened its front in clearing the wood. A company moved through the wood. Owing to enemy shelling while moving through, the whole company was extended into three lines and resumed the normal formation on clearing the wood. No casualties were sustained in the wood. D Company worked in single file along the bridle track near the southern edge of the wood and formed up under cover of the a terraced bank on the south east edge. Three casualties were sustained on entering the wood. C Company formed up on the sunken road in U.18a and not where first ordered, owing to the hostile shelling. The movement forward was splendidly carried out. On the right slight opposition was encountered but easily disposed of. No real opposition was not met with until we were about 200 yards clear of the wood when all three Companies came under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. They deployed at once and moved forward without flinching. All ranks displayed the greatest determination and eagerness to get to the Bosch with the bayonet, this eagerness was to some extent responsible for the heavy casualties as the principle of advancing under covering fire was not sufficiently observed. On the left most progress was made in spite of heavy losses and the enemy hurriedly retired but on discovering later — strength he reformed. The enemy was well entrenched and in strong force, as we had no artillery support, his fire was consequently extremely heavy and unfortunately very accurate. Owing to much strong opposition we were not able to reach our objectives. The attached map shows approximately the line we established. This line is well sited and is a very good defensive position. With determined troops the enemy could easily be held and any advance he attempted would be very expensive. Owing to casualties and to the wide front I sent the Reserve Company to reinforce the right flank at 7.5pm. This Company made good the gap between the right and centre Companies. At the same time I requested the 34th Battalion, which was in support in U.12.a & c. West of the Villers Bretonneux to Aubercourt Road, to send forward a a Company to reinforce the left flank. I instructed the Company Commander, Capt. T S Gilder MC. to reconnoitre the position first and then to moved forward at 8pm. This Company advanced in two lines of two platoons each and took the newly made enemy trenches about 250 yards east of the line then held by us, capturing two light machine guns one of which was damaged and four prisoners belonging to 91st Oldernberg Regiment. Captain Gilder then withdrew and made good good the gap between the left and centre Coys. At 10pm I requested the OC 34th Battalion to send two coys forward, one to the sunken road in U.18.a the other to a position 300 yards North East of Lancer Wood. At 11pm the enemy attempted a local counter attack against my left company, but was repelled. Heavy rain fell from early in the afternoon till late at night. Working over the ploughed field under such conditions affected the Lewis Guns and rifles. Every man was drenched to the skin and very cold, but this did not dampen his ardour. All maps were soon rendered useless and the writing of messages was extremely difficult. Our flanks were somewhat in air. On our left the Warwicks were about 600 yards behind. The 66th Division were on our right, but touch with them was not obtained. In order to secure my right flank the right Supporting Company of the 34th Battalion supplied a platoon for patrolling and also to establish a post South of Lancer Wood on the Villers Bretonneux to Aubercourt Road. Our front was well protected by Vickers and Lewis Guns. We had five Vickers gusn from the 9th Australian Machine Gun Coy, two covered either flank and one the centre and we had 25 Lewis Guns. We were relieved by the 10th Essex and the Royal West Surrey Regiment of the 18th Division in the morning, this relief was completed by 6.15am. After several attempts to choose a reasonably safe position Battalion Headquarters were established at V.7.d.30.95. The prearranged position was untenable. Own Artillery Nil Hostile Artillery The enemy made the use of every gun he had and shelled Lancer Wood and the Villers Bretonneux to Aubercourt Road very heavily with 9.0’s , -.2’s and 7.7’s also employed 10 pounders. He used only —– against our line and caused very few casualties. Casualties 33rd Battalion: Killed Officers 3, OR 28. Wounded officers 6, OR 130, Missing OR 5. 34th Battalion: Killed Officers 1. Wounded OR 24. Missing OR 6 9th MG Coy: Wounded OR 2. 9th Corps Cyclists: Killed officers 1. Wounded OR 1. The strength of the 33rd Battalion was 20 officers and 537 Other Ranks. Although our casualties were high, I consider the end gained well worth this cost. It is interesting to note that the Reserve Coy had only one casualty and that one occurred on completion of relief. Medical 11. The RAP was established on the Villers Bretonneux to Aubercourt Road 200 yards north of the Bois de Hangard, and was in touch with the 9th Australian Field Ambulance at the outset. Between 7pm and 10pm there was a delay in the evacuation owing to the large number of stretcher cases, but this was rectified as soon as possible. Additional stretcher bearers were sent forward by the 33rd and 34th Battalions. From 10pm the horse ambulances came with 400 yards of the RAP and cases were sent from the RAP to this point by wheeled stretchers. It is estimated that 95% of the casualties were caused by bullets. I especially wish to express my deepest appreciation of the splendid work of the 9th Field Ambulance. this unit worked exceedingly hard and is to be highly commended for their efforts. Special mention 12. I have to bring to your notice the names of certain officers, NCOs and men whose action deserve special mention. Recommendations will be submitted later. Signed L J Morshead. Lt Col. Commanding 33rd Battalion, AIF.

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